I. INTRODUCTION
What if a husband tells his wife that he molested the neighbors' three-year-old child at the neighborhood public park? And what if the wife is willing to testify about her husband's confession in a criminal trial, but the husband claims that his confession is privileged? Should the wife be allowed to testify? The answer in more than half of the states and in federal court is no. 1 What if a husband tells his wife that he molested her ten-year-old, mentally handicapped sister while she was visiting for the weekend? Should the wife be allowed to testify about this confession in a criminal trial? The answer in many states and in federal court is no. 2 What if a husband tells his wife that he molested their one-year-old grandson while babysitting him? Should the wife be allowed to testify about this confession? The answer in many states and federal court is * Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I am deeply thankful to Judge Arthur Alarcón of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for his encouragement and mentoring. I would also like to thank Bonnie Treichel and Linda Echegaray for their thorough research and editing assistance and Elizaveta Kabanova for last-minute editing suggestions.
1. Set forth in the Appendix to this Article infra Part VI, Table 2 summarizes the exceptions to the confidential-marital-communications privilege in cases where a spouse confesses to the other spouse that an act of child molestation was committed against a child. See also infra Part III.
2. See, e.g., United States v. McCollum, 58 M.J. 323, 339 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (explaining that the exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege did not extend to defendant's confession to his wife of molesting her minor, mentally handicapped sister); see also Appendix infra Part VI.
The child-of-either-spouse exception, however, is too narrow, especially in child-molestation cases.
The purpose of this Article is to show that jurisdictions should expand the child-of-either-spouse exception so that defendants cannot invoke the confidential-marital-communications privilege in childmolestation cases involving crimes against "any child." If the exception is broadened to the any-child standard, then in all of the hypotheticals set forth above, the husband could not claim that his confession to his wife is protected by the confidential-marital-communications privilege. Part II of this Article explores the history and the general requirements of the marital privileges. Part III analyzes the laws in all fifty states and the federal jurisdictions to determine what exception is being applied in child-molestation cases; an Appendix to this Article, included in Part VI, groups the exceptions into three categories. Part IV of this Article sets forth the reasons why federal courts and state legislatures should adopt the any-child exception and the legal analysis, including proposed legislation, of how they can do so.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 974-77 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege did not extend to the defendant's confession to his wife of making a pornographic video of his grandson); see also Appendix infra Part VI.
4. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) (stating that divorce does not terminate privilege for confidential marital communications made during a valid marriage).
5. See Appendix infra Part VI. 6. United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the confidential-marital-communications privilege fosters marital harmony).
7. See Appendix infra Part VI.
The confidential-marital-communications privilege is broader in scope than the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege and protects all communications made by a spouse to a spouse during a valid marriage, regardless of the current marital status. 11 Unlike the adverse-spousaltestimony privilege, the witness does not hold the maritalcommunications privilege and, therefore, the nontestifying spouse can invoke the privilege even if the witness-spouse wants to testify about the communications.
12 Also, unlike the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege, the marital-communications privilege survives dissolution of a marriage; thus, a defendant can invoke the privilege even if he or she is divorced from the witness. 13 Some scholars have likened the maritalcommunications privilege to a broader version of the attorney-client privilege (or doctor-patient privilege).
14
The marital-communications privilege is considered broader because it may be invoked by either spouse regardless of who made the communication, unlike the attorneyclient privilege, which belongs to the client and can only be waived by the client. The testifying spouse alone has the privilege to refuse to testify and may not be forced to testify or prevented from testifying. 24 Either spouse may assert the privilege; 25 thus, even if one spouse is willing to testify, the other may object and thereby bar the testimony.
26
Timing To claim the privilege, the defendant and the testifying spouse must have a valid marriage at the time the witness is called to testify.
27
The privilege attaches at the time the confidential communication was made between the spouses.
28

Survives
Termination of Marriage?
No, the privilege terminates with the termination of the marriage. 29 Yes, confidential communications made during a valid marriage survive termination of the marriage.
30
Although the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege and confidentialmarriage-communications privilege allow for different levels of protection, they have the same historic roots. 31 To understand the current law and underlying theory of the marital-communications privilege and exceptions to it, one must appreciate how the current legal landscape developed.
has been expanded to encompass more than mere conversations and writings, invocation of the privilege requires the presence of at least a gesture that is communicative or intended by one spouse to convey a message to the other." United States v. Espino, 317 F.3d 788, 795 (8th Cir. 2003 33 have concluded that the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege originated from the common law rule of "spousal disqualification," which provided that a wife was incompetent to testify against or for her husband. 34 The spousal-disqualification rule has medieval roots. 35 Lord Coke observed in 1628 that "it hath beene resolved by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either against or for her husband." 36 Spousal disqualification is based on two tenets of jurisprudence. First, parties were historically incompetent to testify on their own behalf based on the theory that their interest in the proceeding made it probable that their testimony would be unreliable. 37 Second, a husband and wife were considered "one person," and, thus, could not testify against each other; however, since wives were not historically recognized as having a separate legal existence from their husbands, for purposes of this theory, the husband constituted the "one person," which meant that the wife could not testify against the husband.
38 From these two doctrines, the (1936) (explaining that while the rule of spousal disqualification prohibited a witness-spouse from testifying favorably for the defendant-spouse, the testimony privilege prevented the witness-spouse from testifying adversely: "The reason a spouse could not testify against the other was that family dissension and discord would be occasioned"). The wife was prevented from testifying because of the privilege and not because she was considered incompetent or disqualified. Medine, supra note 33, at 523; see also The spousal-disqualification rule, however, began to lose force when Congress passed an act in 1878 making a defendant competent as a witness in any criminal case. 43 The reasoning was that if a defendant was competent to testify on his own behalf, then it was hard to argue that a defendant's wife was incompetent to do so.
The spousaldisqualification rule was finally abolished in 1933, when the Supreme Court in Funk v. United States 44 reasoned that "nor can the exclusion of the wife's testimony, in the face of the broad and liberal extension of the rules in respect of the competency of witnesses generally, be any longer justified, if it ever was justified, on any ground of public policy." 45 Though the witness-spouse was now competent to testify on behalf of the defendant-spouse, the Court "left undisturbed the rule that either spouse could prevent the other from giving adverse testimony. The rule thus evolved into one of privilege rather than one of absolute 39. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44; Recent Decisions, supra note 34, at 329 (noting that the rule of spousal disqualification dealt mainly with the witness-spouse testifying favorably for the defendantspouse: "Against favorable testimony was a fear that the interest of the witness-spouse would cause discoloration of testimony, bias, and offer a temptation to perjure, creating an incompetency which waiver by neither spouse could remove").
40. Lempert, supra note 34, at 728 (quoting COKE, supra note 36). Dean Wigmore presents a different argument, explaining that the privilege originated not from the spousal disqualification rule, but from the doctrine of petit treason: "At that time, a wife or servant who harmed the head of household could be tried for petit treason. Consequently . . . to permit a wife or servant to commit petit treason indirectly by causing the husband's death through their testimony would have been irrational." Developments in the Law, supra note 33, at 1564-65.
41 Although the spousal-disqualification rule evolved into the adversespousal-testimony privilege, the trend in state law was to reject it because it was the nontestifying spouse that was able to exercise the privilege to prevent testimony. 49 In 1980, the Court tackled the privilege once again in Trammel v. United States. 50 After reciting the torrid history of the privilege, 51 the Court held that "'reason and experience' no longer justify so sweeping a rule . . . . Accordingly, we conclude that the existing rule should be modified so that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying." 52 Thus, since Trammel, the spousal-testimony privilege belongs to the spouse who is testifying, and that spouse can decide whether to exercise that privilege. 49. The Hawkins Court upheld the portion of the common law rule that allowed either spouse to prevent adverse testimony by reasoning that "there is still widespread belief, grounded on present conditions, that the law should not force or encourage testimony which might alienate husband and wife, or further inflame existing domestic differences." Id. at 79. The Court further noted that the "basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was a belief that such a policy was necessary to foster family peace, not only for the benefit of husband, wife and children, but for the benefit of the public as well. 57 In Wolfle, the defendant-husband wrote a letter to his wife by dictating its contents to a stenographer who then transcribed the letter. 58 The Court held the communication was not privileged since it was made in the presence of a third party. 59 The Court reasoned:
Communications between the spouses, privately made, are generally assumed to have been intended to be confidential, and hence they are privileged; but, wherever a communication, because of its nature or the circumstances under which it was made, was obviously not intended to be confidential, it is not a privileged communication. 
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PROTECTING "ANY CHILD" 11 eliminated the confidential-marital-communications privilege but kept the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege.
69
Congress debated the revisions and delayed enactment of the rules for two years in part because of the marital privileges. 70 The proposal to abolish the maritalcommunication privilege met with fierce opposition by some who saw it as key to marital harmony. Professor Charles Black wrote a letter to Congressman William L. Hungate opposing the 1975 proposed Federal Rules. 71 He believed eliminating the communications privilege would violate marital privacy:
[T]he meaning of the Rule (made entirely clear in the Advisory Committee's comments) is that, however intimate, however private, however embarrassing may be a disclosure by one spouse to another, or some fact discovered, within the privacies of marriage, by one spouse about another, that disclosure of fact can be wrung from the spouse under penalty of being held in contempt of court, if it is thought barely relevant to the issues in anybody's lawsuit for breach of a contract to sell a carload of apples. . . . It seems clear to me that this Rule trenches on the area of marital privacy so staunchly defended by the Supreme Court . . . .
72
Despite Professor Black's concerns, the Advisory Committee reasoned that because most married couples were unaware of the maritalcommunications privilege, it probably had little influence on how spouses conducted themselves inside the marriage. Congress ultimately decided to abandon any evidence rule providing for a specific privilege. 74 Instead, Congress adopted a single rule, 501, which provides in relevant part that all evidentiary privileges in the federal courts would be "governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."
75 By adopting this single evidentiary rule, Congress "acknowledge[d] the authority of the federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges in federal criminal trials" leaving the law of the marital privileges in their present state.
III. CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE CONFIDENTIAL-MARITAL-COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE IN CHILD-MOLESTATION CASES
All fifty states have codified the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege and the confidential-marital-communications privilege. 76 The military CRIM. L. 339, 362 (2006). 74. The Advisory Committee proposed that Article V of the Federal Rules contain thirteen rules relating to privilege. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee's note. Congress, however, rejected this proposal because there was some concern the specific thirteen rules included modifications to common law privileges which might be unconstitutional or raise federalism concerns. Id. and the District of Columbia have also codified both privileges. 77 Three common exceptions to the privileges exist. 78 First, the privilege generally does not apply in cases where the communication concerns present or future criminal activity. 79 Second, the privilege generally does not apply in cases involving crimes against the spouse.
80 Third, the privilege does not apply for a crime against the child of either spouse.
81
The remaining portion of this Article examines how this third exception applies to the marital-communications privilege in childmolestation cases. The Article focuses on the confidential-maritalcommunications privilege because it is broader in scope than the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege. The defendant has much more power to invoke the marital-communications privilege because it is the nontestifying spouse that holds the privilege for all communications made during the marriage. Thus, unlike the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege, it does not matter whether the spouse wants to testify about the communications or whether the marriage has been terminated-the nontestifying spouse can prevent the testimony.
82
As argued in the remainder of this Article, however, it is in precisely these cases, where child molestation has occurred, that a spouse who wants to testify should not be prevented from doing so. Many jurisdictions carve out an exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege, but only 1987 ) (finding that the marital-communications privilege does not apply to on-going or future crimes in which both spouses are participants). There is, however, a split among the Circuits with regard to this "partner in crime" exception. The Sixth and the Eighth Circuits have ruled that the "partner in crime exception" is narrowly construed to only those "communications regarding 'patently illegal activity. ' in cases where the crime is against the "child of either spouse." This exception is too narrow.
A. The Problem of the Narrow Exception of "Child of Either Spouse"
Because the child-of-either-spouse exception is too narrow, unreasonable legal analysis results. Two cases exemplify this problem. In the 2003 military case of United States v. McCollum, the defendant admitted to his wife that he raped her fourteen-year-old, mentally handicapped sister who was residing with the couple for about one month during the summer. 83 The defendant claimed that the statements he made to his wife about the rape were confidential marital communications and, thus, entitled to privilege. 84 The military evidence rule, at that time, 85 provided an exception to the privilege in "proceedings in which one spouse is charged with a crime against the . . . child of either." 86 The government argued that the language "child of either" should include those children considered to be "de facto" children. 87 The court disagreed and found that the intent of the drafters was that "child of either" "applies to only those situations in which a child is the biological child of one of the spouses" or "legally recognized child."
88 Thus, the court held that a de facto child did not constitute a Given the significant social and legal policy implications of extending the privilege with respect to custodial relationships with children, we would expect such an intent to be represented in express language, rather than pressed or squeezed from the present text. Therefore, we think the better view is that "child of either," as used in M.R.E. 504(c)(2)(A), applies to only those situations in which a child is the biological child of one of the spouses, the legally recognized child, or ward of one of the spouses. . . . . Whether a de facto child exception to the marital communications privilege should apply to courts-martial is a legal policy question best addressed by the political and policy-making elements of the government. Because the defendant's sister-in-law was not a legally recognized ward of either spouse, the court found that the defendant correctly asserted that the marital-confidential-communications privilege protected his wife's testimony.
90
In the recent 2009 Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Banks, the Court extended the exception to include a de facto child of either spouse, but even this slight extension led to unreasonable legal analysis. 91 In Banks, during a search of the defendant's home, the authorities found a pornographic video of the defendant's two-year-old grandson.
92
The defendant was charged with criminal counts relating to "possession, production, transportation and receipt of images depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct."
93 During the trial, the defendant's wife testified that the defendant had admitted to her that he made the video of their grandson. 94 Although the defendant objected, claiming the marital-communications privilege protected his wife's testimony, the trial court allowed the wife's testimony. 95 The defendant was found guilty; key to this ruling was the wife's testimony. 96 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that the confidential-maritalcommunications privilege did not apply to statements "relating to a crime where one spouse or a spouse's children are the victims." 97 The Ninth Circuit explained that when there was a child "functionally equivalent" to that of the natural child, the exception to the marital-communications privilege should extend. 98 However, in applying this narrowly drawn 89 . Id. at 341. 90. Id. at 341, 343. While the court held that it was error to admit the wife's testimony, the court found the error harmless. Id. at 343. The court explained: "Although the qualitative nature of Appellant's statements makes resolution of this issue a close one, we conclude that the other evidence against Appellant was sufficiently incriminating that Appellant would have been convicted even if his statements had been properly excluded." Id. In the concurring opinion, Chief Judge Crawford expanded the exception to the privilege and concluded that the term "child of either" should include de facto children. Id. at 344 (Crawford, J., concurring). Crawford found an overriding public policy interest which emphasized the importance of protecting children from abuse. Id. (citing Dunn v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365 (Ct. App. 1993) (interpreting the "child of either" language in California's exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege to include a foster child)).
91 The court held that the grandson was not the functional equivalent of a natural child, despite the two-year-old grandson living with the defendant for six months. 100 Banks and McCollum exemplify the problem with a narrowly construed exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege when the communications concern child molestation. It is unreasonable and against public policy to limit the exception to only communications concerning the biological child of either spouse or even slightly broadening the exception to include communications only concerning a de facto child. No significant difference exists between a crime against a biological child of a married couple, against a child visiting the home, against a grandson, or against any child; the general welfare of all children outweigh any benefit in keeping communications confidential in a marriage that has been deeply compromised by the confessions of a criminal and deviant sexual act. 101 Nevertheless, state laws and the federal courts are divergent in their application of exceptions to the confidential-marital-communications privilege in childmolestation cases.
B. The Response of the States
State laws concerning exceptions to the use of the confidentialmarital-communications privilege in child-molestation cases are inconsistent. The Appendix to this Article, in Part VI, surveys the functional equivalent of a child should be afforded the same protections as violence against the birth or step-child of a married couple.").
99. The Ninth Circuit explained: This is not a case in which a child was raised by grandparents and, therefore, could be said to share a parent/child relationship with those caretakers. Rather, this situation demonstrates a strong grandparent/grandchild relationship. Although such a relationship is important to building strong extended families and improving society, it is not the type that creates the same overriding policy concerns that led us to limit the marital communications privilege to protect children of the marriage. Id. at 976. 100. Id. Despite the finding that the district court erred in the application of the exception to the marital-communication privilege, the court found this error to be harmless. Id. at 978. The court held that even in the absence of the wife's testimony that defendant admitted to making the video, the district court still would have found the defendant to be guilty based on items shown in the video linking the video to the defendant and based on the testimony of the other witnesses. Id. at 977-78.
101. See infra Part IV. The child-of-either-spouse is the narrowest exception because it is only applicable in cases when a case concerns the abuse and molestation of a biological child or legally recognized child of either spouse.
Thirteen states have adopted this narrow exception. 103 Ten of these thirteen states have extended "child of either" to cover those situations in which the child is in the care or custody of either spouse and where the spouses are acting as de facto parents, 104 including foster children. The husband-wife privilege exists to encourage marital confidences and thereby preserve the marital relationship. The "child of either" exception was created to permit prosecution for crimes committed within the family unit. Such crimes would normally have no other witnesses and would go unpunished in the event the exception in the statute were not permitted to operate.
In light of the purpose of the exception, we conclude that a foster child is properly included within the "child of either" category . . . . This purpose would not be served by affording protection to only those children of a family unit with legal or biological relationships. Rather, it is to ensure that those individuals, particularly minor children, KANSAS Laws which fit into this second category are broader than the childof-either-spouse exception because it is unnecessary to establish a de facto parental status for the exception to apply. This exception extends to a child who is living in the home but who is neither a biological child of either spouse, nor in the care or custody of either spouse. State statutes that fall into this category track language similar to that found in Utah's statute, which provides that the confidential-maritalcommunications privilege does not apply " Some courts have gone to great lengths to try to extend this exception. For example, after a laborious analysis of the history of the definition of "residing," one court interpreted the statutory term to include a child who had been "visiting" the home for four days when the incident occurred. 109 However, courts should not have to apply such tortured reasoning to extend the exception; instead, all state legislatures should adopt the any-child exception.
who are present in the home and are actively a part of the family structure are protected, via criminal prosecution, for crimes committed against them. The any-child exception is the broadest exception to the confidentialmarital-communications privilege because it applies to communications involving the molestation 110 of any child, including biological children, grandchildren, neighbors' children, and children without any connection to the family home. State statutes that fall into this category track language similar to that found in Mississippi's statute, which provides that there is no confidential-marital-communications privilege where "one spouse is charged with a crime against (1) the person of any minor child."
111 While adoption of the any-child exception is a relatively new trend, 112 currently twenty-five states have adopted this broad standard.
113
In sum, the states are split. Approximately half have adopted the narrower exceptions-categories one and two-to the confidentialmarital-communications privilege, and half have recently adopted the 110. This Article is limited to the exceptions to the confidential-marital-communications privilege in child-molestation cases. There are clear arguments that can be made to extend this exception to all child abuse cases; however, the analysis and theory as to why it should be extended to the broader crime of child abuse is the subject of another article. Some state statutes have been written specifically to carve out sexual abuse cases from other child abuse cases. broader any-child exception-category three. 114 As set forth in Section IV, the states that have adopted the narrower exception should amend their statutes to encompass the any-child exception.
C. The Response of the Federal Courts
While the states are split, no federal court of appeals has adopted the any-child exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege. Indeed, only two courts of appeals, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, have squarely addressed this issue, and they are split on what the standard should be. The Ninth Circuit has adopted the narrowest standard and falls into category one-child-of-either-spouse standard. The Tenth Circuit falls into category two-child-residing-in-the-home standard.
115
The Tenth Circuit adopted the child-residing-in-the-home standard in the case United States v. Bahe. 116 The defendant in Bahe molested an eleven-year-old female relative who was visiting the family household.
117
At trial, the defendant's wife attempted to provide testimony concerning how the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse. 118 This testimony was important to the government because this was the same allegation made by the eleven-year-old victim. 119 The district court, however, excluded the wife's testimony on the ground that the testimony was a protected form of communication under the marital-communications privilege.
120
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded that while the testimony constituted a confidential marital communication, it was subject to an exception. 121 The court recognized that no other circuit had extended the exception beyond a case where the defendant was charged with an offense against the "children of either" spouse, which presented a problem in the current case because the child was a relative, not a biological child of either spouse. 122 The court, however, held that no 
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PROTECTING "ANY CHILD" 21 significant difference existed between a crime against the child of a spouse and the crime against a relative child in the home. 123 The court reasoned:
We see no significant difference, as a policy matter, between a crime against a child of the married couple, against a stepchild living in the home or, as here, against an eleven-year-old relative visiting in the home. Child abuse is a horrendous crime. It generally occurs in the home and is often covered up by the innocence of small children and by threats against disclosure. 124 When this same issue was raised in the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Banks, the court refused to adopt the Bahe standard. 125 The Ninth Circuit criticized Bahe explaining: "No other circuit has adopted such a broad exemption to the federal marital communications privilege."
126
After rejecting the Bahe standard, the Ninth Circuit adopted the narrowest exception, the child-of-either-spouse standard 127 and, thus, held the privilege did not apply to communications made by the defendant to his wife concerning the molestation of their grandson.
128
Even though the Bahe standard is somewhat broader than the standard adopted in Banks, both Circuits rejected adopting the broadest any-child exception.
While the Ninth and Tenth Circuits are the only federal courts of appeal that have addressed this issue, a few other cases from district courts in other circuits are on point. 129 One district court in the Fifth Circuit, for example, has attempted to extend the exception to the anychild standard, 130 but it remains to be seen if the Fifth Circuit will follow defendant was charged with a crime against the child of his wife 
IV. FEDERAL COURTS AND STATE LEGISLATURES SHOULD ADOPT THE ANY-CHILD EXCEPTION TO THE CONFIDENTIAL-MARITAL-COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE
A. Why Adopt the Any-Child Exception?
What is unique about child-molestation cases as opposed to murder, for example, which leads to the conclusion that federal courts and state legislatures should adopt the broad any-child exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege? This Part answers that question and then sets forth the legal analysis for how federal courts and state legislatures can justify adopting the any-child exception. There are four reasons why the any-child exception should be adopted.
Child Molestation Is a Unique Crime in that It Is Often Difficult to Prosecute Due to the Lack of Witness Testimony and Physical Evidence
The Supreme Court has recognized that child abuse is "one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute." 131 There are a number of reasons why child molestation, in particular, is difficult to prosecute. 132 First, there are often no witnesses to child sexual abuse except the childvictim. 133 If the child is young, like the two-year-old grandson in the 
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Banks case, 134 then the child may be developmentally unable to testify. Certainly, in the case of an infant, it would be impossible for the child to testify. Even if the child is old enough to testify, the courtroom experience can be extremely traumatic for the child. This is often increased by the close proximity of the defendant in the courtroom 135 and is "particularly acute when the abuser is a parent."
136 Traumatized childvictims can be afraid to tell the entire truth and also can have blurred memories, which, in turn, raises concern of witness credibility. 137 Because child sexual abuse generally occurs in secret, it is difficult to find witnesses. 138 138. Sopher, supra note 131, at 643; see also Tadic v. State, 635 S.E.2d 356, 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that "sexual offenses against children necessarily occur in secret"); In re Nicole V., 518 N.E.2d at 915 (finding that because of the nonviolent nature of child sexual abuse, the abuse is generally in secret and is, therefore, difficult to detect); Jones, 772 P.2d at 499 (stating that "[a]cts of abuse generally occur in private"); De La Paz, supra note 131, at 449 (explaining that child sexual molestation is a "crime of opportunity" in which the assailant initiates the act when the assailant is KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 who can testify about child sexual abuse, including a spouse, should be allowed to testify.
139
Second, there is often little physical evidence in child-molestation cases. 140 The signs of physical molestation are rare because medical examinations only show "evidence of sexual abuse in twenty to thirty percent" of cases. 141 The nature of the abuse, generally consisting of "lewd fondling, digital penetration, or the child being forced to perform sex acts upon the assailant," results in little physical evidence. 142 Moreover, physical evidence is rare because children often "succumb easily" and do not try to resist their sexual assailants and, thus, little physical evidence can be detected from the attack. 143 Finally, frequently delays in reporting abuse decrease the likelihood of any physical evidence. 144 Because of the lack of physical evidence in child sexual abuse cases, the only evidence often comes from the child who is forced to testify which, as set forth above, leads to difficulty in securing a conviction.
145
alone with the child); Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177, 181 (1983) (explaining that the reality of child abuse is that it occurs "only when the child is alone with the offending adult, and it must never be shared with anyone else"); Gimenez, supra note 137, at 234 (stating that secretiveness is an issue that surrounds child sexual abuse); Melissa R. Saad, Note, Civil Commitment and the Sexually Violent Predator, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 595, 603 (1998) (stating that "the number of child sex abuse cases reported actually represents only a fraction of the actual number of offenses committed because of a significant number of clandestine incestuous incidents"); Yun, supra note 137, at 1750 (explaining that generally the only witnesses in child sex abuse cases are the victim and the perpetrator because "people simply do not molest children in front of others" and generally the molester is a relative or close acquaintance that is alone with the child on many occasions).
139. See, e.g., People v. Allman, 342 N.Y.S.2d 896, 899-900 (App. Div. 1973) (explaining that the prevention of testimony because of the confidential-marital-communications privilege would seal "the lips of the witnessing spouse . . . to the detriment of the child; and the injustice of the act may never be uncovered").
140. Sopher, supra note 131, at 644; see also Jones, 772 P.2d at 499 (stating that "many cases leave no physical evidence"); Wendel, supra note 135, at 322 (explaining that it is often the problem in child sexual abuse cases that there is "no independent physical evidence corroborating the [child's] claim"); Yun, supra note 137, at 1749-50 (explaining that "physical corroboration is rare" because the child sexual abuse crimes are "predominantly nonviolent in nature").
141. Sopher, supra note 131, at 644; see also Saad, supra note 138, at 603 (explaining that the symptoms of child sex abuse victims are varied and sometimes nonexistent).
142. De La Paz, supra note 131, at 449. 143. Yun, supra note 137, at 1750; see also LANNING, supra note 135, at 181 (explaining that children are the "ideal victims" of sexual abuse because they are easily led by adults and they are taught to obey adults' instructions).
144. Sopher, supra note 131, at 644. 145. Tadic v. State, 635 S.E.2d 356, 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (asserting that "more often than not the child/victim is the only witness able to provide such direct evidence"); see also In re Nicole V., 518 N.E.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. 1987) (finding that because of the secretive nature of the child sexual abuse, the child is usually the only witness); Jones, 772 P.2d at 499 (stating that "prosecutors must 2010] PROTECTING "ANY CHILD" 25
Because of the difficulty in successfully prosecuting child sexual abuse, this crime, unlike others, requires a broad exception under the marital-communications privileges. The prosecution of molestation cases presents the same problems regardless of whether the child is the biological child of the perpetrator, the neighbor's child, or the child with no connection to the family home. Thus, no logical reason limits the exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege only to children with connections to the family home. Indeed, because childmolestation cases are difficult to prove, courts have created exceptions to other evidentiary privileges but without any delineation of whether the child was a "child of either" spouse or a child "residing in the home."
146
The exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege should follow the same route.
Molestation of Any Child Negatively Impacts Marital Harmony, Which the Confidential-Marital-Communications Privilege Purportedly Protects
The purpose of the confidential-marital-communications privilege is to promote marital harmony. 147 The underlying policy is that spouses will more freely communicate with one another if they know that their deepest secrets will not later be exposed in a court. 148 The societal benefit of marital harmony presumably resulting from free interspousal communication is deemed sufficiently important, on the whole, to outweigh the societal benefit of facilitating the fact-finding process in the judicial system. 149 The very act of child molestation, however, strikes at rely on the testimony of the child victim to make their cases"); Yun, supra note 137, at 1749 (explaining that the child's hearsay statement is often the only proof of the sexual abuse crime). 146. See, e.g., De La Paz, supra note 131, at 449 (explaining that under Florida law, "similar fact evidence" is allowed in some cases of child sexual abuse when the strict requirements under the rule are met); Yun, supra note 137, at 1749 ("[T]he principles underlying the hearsay rule require that an out-of-court statement be admissible only if the requisite need and reliability can be shown. Because of the unique circumstances of child sex abuse, hearsay statements of the victim are especially necessary to establish the guilt of the defendant."). the heart of marital harmony. While undoubtedly child molestation is a heinous crime, it is also a clear violation of the marital vows. Sexual abuse of a child does not further marital harmony; indeed, the very act suggests that the marriage is in shambles. 150 When a child has been sexually abused, the bond of trust and confidence held so dearly in the marriage is most certainly broken; not only is the act of intimacy with another partner deceptive, but moreover, the act of intimacy by abusive means would likely break the trust and confidence in any marriage. It does not further the sanctity of the marriage or the family relationship to allow one spouse to talk to another about child molestation with impunity. 151 Arguably, the insult to the spouse may be personally greater if it is his or her child that is molested by the other spouse. 152 Regardless of the personal insult, however, the overall harm to marital harmony is the same whether it is a "child of either" spouse, a child "living in the home," or a child previously unknown to the spouses. 153 As one court explained: "It would be unconscionable to permit a privilege grounded on promoting communications of trust and love between marriage partners to prevent a properly outraged spouse with knowledge from testifying against the perpetrator of such a crime."
154
To argue the contrary-that confidentiality concerning child molestation would foster a stronger marital relationship-is irrational. The societal benefit gained by public exposure of child molestation far outweighs any injury that could be caused to the marital relationship by disclosure of such communications, particularly in light of the fact that most married couples do not even know that the privilege exists. 155 150. Cf. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) ("When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding-whatever the motivation-their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve."). This is certainly even more the case when a spouse is accused of child molestation.
151. United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975) (explaining that "a serious crime against a child is an offense against that family harmony"). 
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Molestation of Any Child Negatively Impacts the Society at Large
One court explained that "a serious crime against a child is an offense . . . to society."
156 This is particularly true in child-molestation cases. Unlike other criminal offenders, child sex offenders often victimize multiple children and have strong, continuous urges to reoffend. 157 Child sexual abuse is also unique in comparison to other crimes because of the effects the crime leaves on the victims. For example, when compared to children who have not been sexually abused, sexually abused children are fifty-five percent more likely to be arrested later in life, five-hundred percent more likely to be arrested for sex crimes later in life, and three-thousand percent more likely to be arrested for adult prostitution.
158 Thus, while all crime has a negative impact on society, because of the recidivist nature of the offender and because of the negative impact on each victim's future, society at large is particularly harmed if child-molestation cases are not successfully prosecuted. The harm to society is the same, regardless of whether the child is the biological child of the offender or unknown to the offender. Thus, the any-child exception to the confidential-maritalcommunications privilege should be adopted to protect society from harm.
159 "[A] contrary rule would make children a target population within the marital enclave." 160 156. Allery, 526 F.2d at 1366; see also Martinez, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 837 ("Children, especially those of tender years who cannot defend themselves or complain, are vulnerable to abuse. Society has a stronger interest in protecting such children than in preserving marital autonomy and privacy.").
157. Saad, supra note 138, at 604; see also CHILD MOLESTATION STATISTICS, http://childsafetips.com.abouttips.com/child-molestation-statistics.php (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) (asserting that the average molester will molest fifty girls before being caught and convicted). 159. See Martinez, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (adopting the any-child exception to the confidentialmarital-communications privilege the court explained: "The Court has not searched the dark corners of the world, nor that era when mankind lived within the confines of a cave that might call for a contrary result. The Court therefore concludes that in a case where one spouse is accused of abusing minor children, society's interest in the administration of justice far outweighs its interest in protecting whatever harmony or trust may at that point still remain in the marital relationship."). The importance of the public interest at issue is evidenced by the fact that currently twenty-five state legislatures have adopted the broad anychild exception. 161 This current trend shows that the communications between spouses concerning child molestation are not protected because "they are antithetical to society's concept of the marital relationship." 162 Thus, as a matter of policy, many state legislatures and courts see no difference in the sexual abuse of a child who is the son or daughter of the abuser as opposed to any other child who is sexually abused. 163 Indeed, a narrower application of the exception for children under the maritalcommunications privilege might be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the exception would only protect a child of either spouse or a child in the home as opposed to other children without any rational basis. 
, dissenting) ( "Since
Trammel was decided in 1980, courts, federal and state, and state legislatures, have continued to limit the marital communications privilege in obedience to the Court's direction that it 'must be strictly construed and accepted only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilization of all rational means for ascertaining the truth.'" (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980))).
163. See, e.g., id. at 988 ("'We see no logical reason for the Legislature to deny the spousal privilege when a young victim of abuse is a child of one or both spouses (or other child closely related by consanguinity) but to perpetuate the privilege when the young victim is related to neither spouse. The abuse is the same. Society's interest in convicting and punishing one who commits child abuse is the same. The threat to the preservation of the family unit arising from one spouse being compelled to testify against the other seems substantially identical in all instances.'" (quoting Villalta v. Commonwealth, 702 N.E.2d 1148 (Mass. 1998))); United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1446 (10th Cir. 1997) ("We see no significant difference, as a policy matter, between a crime against a child of the married couple, against a stepchild living in the home or, as here, against an elevenyear-old relative visiting the home.").
164. 167-68 (2001) . Potentially, the current version of the rule may violate the Equal Protection Clause. MRE 504 might be unconstitutional if there is not a reasonable justification for allowing a spouse to testify to confidential communications concerning biological children while simultaneously refusing to allow the testimony of similar communications involving de facto children who are abused or even murdered. Although the classification, "a child of either spouse" versus all other children residing in the home is only subject to rational basis review, if the distinction is arbitrary or capricious it will nonetheless violate the Equal Protection Clause.
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B. How Federal Courts Can Adopt the Any-Child Exception
Although no federal court of appeals has adopted the any-child exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege, the legal rationale to do so is supported by both jurisprudence and public policy. To begin, the confidential-marital-communications privilege is not a constitutional right, but a privilege with common law roots. 165 Because it is a privilege, it is not "intended to facilitate the fact-finding process or to safeguard its integrity."
166 Thus, the effect of the privilege "is clearly inhibitive; rather than facilitating the illumination of truth, [it] shut[s] out the light."
167 Because the confidential-marital-communications privilege impedes the truth-seeking process by withholding relevant testimony, it must be "strictly construed." language to mean that the extent of evidentiary privileges must undergo a balancing test. 172 Thus, to determine the extent of exceptions to the confidential-marital-communications privilege, the interest of protecting marital harmony must be balanced with the interest of truth-seeking in child-molestation cases.
173
In United States v. Allery, the Eighth Circuit applied the balancing test to an analogous situation. 174 The issue in Allery was whether there should be an exception to the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege, which would allow a wife to testify against a husband in the case of the sexual abuse of the husband's step-child. 175 That issue is narrower than the issue addressed in this Article, which is whether there should be an anychild exception to confidential-marital-communications privilege in child-molestation cases. Nevertheless, Allery is still instructive for several reasons. Allery illustrates how to approach the legal analysis of applying a new exception to one of the marital privileges under Rule 501 in child-molestation cases.
176
Allery is particularly helpful since the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege and the confidential-maritalcommunications privilege have similar history and are derived from the same common law roots. 177 Moreover, the underlying policy of each privilege is to protect the marital unit. 178 Thus, Allery sets forth an appropriate analysis for determining whether exceptions to the confidential-marital-communications privilege should be expanded.
The Allery court found that exceptions to the adverse-spousaltestimony privilege should include crimes against the child of either spouse for the following five reasons: (1) a serious crime against a child is an offense to society and family harmony, which the privilege 172. United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit had adopted "the balancing test set forth by the Eighth Circuit in" Allery (citing Allery, 526 F.2d at 1366-67)).
173. Id. (noting that the confidential-marital-communications privilege is a "balancing [of] the public's interest in the full and fair administration of justice and the need to protect the integrity of marriage and ensure that spouses freely communicate").
174. purportedly protects, (2) parental testimony is necessary in prosecutions for child abuse, (3) limiting "truth" leads to the miscarriage of justice, (4) state common law supports an adverse-spousal-testimony privilege exception for crimes against children of either spouse, and (5) "at least eleven states have passed laws rendering the marital privilege unapplicable in cases of charged child abuse and neglect." 179 These factors set forth by Allery can be applied to the issue herewhether the exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege exception should be expanded to protect any child in childmolestation cases. As addressed in Part IV.A of this Article, the abuse of any child would have a negative impact on family harmony and society. 180 Moreover, communications between spouses comprise critical testimony, given the difficulty in successfully prosecuting childmolestation cases.
181 Finally, twenty-five state legislatures-more than double the "eleven states" mentioned in Allery-have recognized that the need to protect children outweighs the value of protecting the marriage relationship and, thus, have expanded the exception to the confidentialmarital-communications privilege to include the any-child standard.
182
This last point alone is enough to tip the balancing scales in favor of adopting the any-child exception since federal courts are to consider consensus among state laws when applying Rule 501. 
C. How State Legislatures Can Adopt the Any-Child Exception
Half of the state legislatures and the District of Columbia have yet to adopt the broadest any-child exception to the confidential-maritalcommunications privilege. 186 These jurisdictions should adopt the anychild exception for the public-policy reasons set forth above, including: child-molestation cases are difficult to prove, and, thus, communications about the crime between spouses may prove critical; and child molestation of any child, regardless of the connection to the family home, is an offense to marital harmony and to society.
187
It is the responsibility of the legislatures to balance competing considerations in law.
188
A proposed law would track language similar to those states which have adopted the any-child exception. 189 The law could provide that a person has no confidential-marital-communications privilege where one spouse is charged with the molestation of any child. Because problems of prosecuting child-molestation cases decreases as the age of the child increases (older children are likely more capable of testifying about sexual abuse than younger children), 190 state laws should also make clear that any child would include individuals under the age of sixteen or an individual with the mental ability of a sixteen-year-old. 188. See Scallen, supra 155, at 541 (stating that "virtually all privileges . . . are subject to multiple exceptions, meaning that even though a holder of a privilege may want to refuse to provide certain evidence, as a matter of policy lawmakers could not allow the evidence to be withheld from the trier of fact").
189. See supra Part III.B; see also Appendix infra Part VI (any-child category). 190. See supra Part IV.A.1. 191. The age limit could be either sixteen or eighteen years of age depending on the state's statutory rape law. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62(a) (2010) ("A person commits the crime of rape in the second degree if: (1) Being 16 years old or older, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex less than 16 . . . . (2) He or she engages in sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex who is incapable of consent by reason of being mentally defective.");
It is important for state legislatures to adopt these laws because it impacts the way child-molestation cases are prosecuted in both state and federal courts. 192 If all states would enact similar laws adopting the anychild exception less confusion would result. Parties would not be forced to litigate what constitutes de facto parental status 193 or what constitutes a child "living in the home."
194 With the any-child exception it would be clear to a lay-person and law-person alike that, in child-molestation cases, child-predators cannot confess to their spouse and then hide behind an evidentiary privilege.
D. Legal Theory Supports the Adoption of the Any-Child Exception
Not only does public policy and jurisprudence support the adoption of the any-child exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege, legal theory supports the same conclusion. Generally, scholars have identified two legal theories concerning evidentiary privileges: (1) Wigmore's "Instrumental Rationale" and (2) the "Humanistic Rationale." 195 Each theory will be taken in turn.
Wigmore's Instrumental Rationale
Courts often cite to Wigmore's Instrumental Rationale when considering the application of evidentiary privileges. 196 Essentially, Wigmore's Instrumental Rationale rests "on the factual assumption of a causal connection between the existence of a privilege and certain out-ofcourt behavior."
197 Under this theory, evidentiary privileges, given that KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 they impede the truth-seeking function of the courts, should be recognized only if four conditions have been met:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
198
If a privilege fails to meet any of these four conditions, then it is not valid under the Instrumental Rationale.
199 By extension, the failure of an existing privilege to meet any one of these conditions could provide a basis to abrogate that privilege. 200 In other words, if the use of the confidential-marital-communications privilege in child-molestation cases compromises any one of these conditions, then the Instrumental Rationale could be used to support a necessary exception to the privilege.
While most scholars agree that the confidential-maritalcommunications privilege meets the first and third conditions of the Instrumental Rationale, critics have questioned whether the second and fourth conditions are met. 201 For the second condition, the privilege of confidentiality may not be essential to spousal relations since, in practice, most spouses would continue to confide in each other even if the privilege were not present. 202 The privilege may not meet the fourth condition for similar reasons. If the marital relationship is not based on a presumption of confidentiality, then a breach of the confidentiality would not be sufficiently detrimental to outweigh the interests in divulging the 198 202. See Story, supra note 59, at 306. This privilege may be contrasted to the attorney-client relationship, in which the privilege is critical to maintaining the affiliation. See id. Critics contend that the underlying policy of encouraging confidences between spouses is not fostered because spouses are unaware that the privilege even exists. See id.; see also 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 34, § 86, at 384 (explaining that "the probable benefits of the rule of privilege in encouraging marital confidences and wedded harmony are doubtful" because "in the lives of most people appearance in court as a party or witness is an exceedingly rare and unusual event, and the anticipation of it is not one of those factors which materially influence in daily life the degree of fullness of marital disclosures"); Scallen, supra note 155, at 559; Developments in the Law, supra note 33, at 1579.
2010] PROTECTING "ANY CHILD" 35
information at trial. 203 Therefore, it would be appropriate to abrogate the privilege, or provide exceptions to it, where the expectation of confidentiality is minimal and the benefit for litigation purposes is significant. This is precisely the case with the use of the confidentialmarital-communications privilege in child-molestation prosecutions. As stated earlier, for at least four reasons the interest in protecting children, regardless of their connection to the family unit, outweighs the benefit, if any, gained by allowing a person to invoke the privilege in childmolestation cases. 204 
The Humanistic Rationale
The Humanistic Rationale states that evidentiary privileges should be designed to protect individual rights.
205 Unlike Wigmore's Instrumental Rationale, which generally focuses on the benefit to society by furtherance of relationships, the Humanistic Rationale focuses on the individual's personal rights, such as the protection of privacy. 206 The protection of privacy justification for the use of the confidential-maritalcommunications privilege, however, fails in the context of child sexual abuse.
First, while this theory is discussed among scholars, courts have not relied on it for the confidential-marital-communications privilege. 207 Moreover, if privacy is a justification for the marital-communications privilege, it is only in so far as the confidential-marital-communications privilege is a qualified privilege, affording exceptions in cases where evidence is not otherwise obtainable. 208 Thus, in cases of child sexual abuse where it is well-established that evidence is difficult to obtain, regardless of whether the child is related to either spouse, an exception to the confidential-marital-communication privilege must exist.
V. CONCLUSION
Child molestation is an unbearable crime. Many children are sexually abused outside their own homes by predators that have no relationship to them. A child in this situation should receive no less protection from sexual abuse than a "child of either spouse" or a child "living in the home." Yet, in all federal circuits, half of the states, the District of Columbia, and the military, this is exactly the scenario when defendants confess their crimes to their spouses and then invoke the confidential-marital-communications privilege.
210
Public policy, jurisprudence, and legal theory support the adoption of a broad any-child exception to the use of the confidential-marital-communications privilege in child-molestation cases. 250. Title 42, section 5913 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes apply an exception to the marital communications privilege for sex crimes and rape when any child is the victim of the crime, but applying only to children in the "care or custody" of either spouse when the child is a victim of all other crimes.
251. Section 12-17-10 of the General Laws of Rhode Island abolishes the maritalcommunications privilege and, therefore, any time a child is subject of criminal abuse, there is no privilege for marital communications. See State v. Angell, 405 A.2d 10, 16 (R.I. 1979) (holding that section "12-17-10 has altered the common-law privilege of confidential communications between a husband and wife").
252. Adams v. State, 563 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (holding that "the marital privilege does not apply so as to prevent the admission of testimony by a defendant's spouse concerning acts of violence or personal injury inflicted by the defendant upon the children of either spouse or upon minor children in the custody of or under the dominion and control of either spouse").
